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The health case for economic and social rights against the global marketplace 
 
Ted Schrecker (http://uottawa.academia.edu/TedSchrecker) 
Institute of Population Health, University of Ottawa, Canada 
 
 
 
“All observations of life are harsh, because life is.  I lament that fact, but I cannot change it.” 
 - Margaret Atwood, The Tent (McClelland & Stewart, 2006) 
 
Abstract 
Over the past few decades, most of the world’s economies and societies have been integrated 
into the global marketplace, revealing and deepening various socioeconomic divisions.  In this 
article I undertake three major tasks.  First, I  outline the processes that have led to that 
deepening, identify the underlying set of values, and indicate the connection with influences on 
population health.  Second, I compare and contrast a policy perspective that takes seriously 
economic and social rights related to health with the values of the global marketplace.  Third, I 
argue that emerging aspects of globalization underscore the urgency of the human rights 
challenge to the global marketplace. I also suggest a research agenda focusing on the conditions 
under which governments are likely to respond in ways that strengthen their commitment to 
economic and social rights domestically and internationally, while at the same time offering 
some rather pessimistic observations about the prospects for policy change.   
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Introduction:  The global marketplace and perfect storms 
The most powerful chapter in historical sociologist Margaret Somers’ important book 
Genealogies of Citizenship (Somers 2008) presents the devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane 
Katrina and its human consequences as a parable illustrating the state of citizenship in the 
contemporary United States – or, more accurately, the collapse of citizenship and its replacement 
with a series of exchange relations based on mutual advantage and open only to those with the 
price of admission.  When the hurricane hit and the levees broke, it became apparent that 
evacuation plans presumed that everyone had access to an automobile.  Those who could afford 
to do so packed up the car and drove to higher ground.  Others, overwhelmingly poor and 
African-American, were left to fend for themselves as refugees in their own country.  As Somers 
puts it: “Unable to fulfill their side of the newly marketized exchange called citizenship, the left-
behind of New Orleans … did not elicit much concern at any level of government because with 
their social exclusion they were no longer recognized as moral equals.  They had become a 
surplus, superfluous, and disposable population” (p. 72).  
Over the past few decades, most of the world’s economies and societies have been 
influenced, if not transformed, by globalization: “[a] pattern of transnational economic 
integration animated by the ideal of creating self-regulating global markets for goods, services, 
capital, technology, and skills” (Eyoh and Sandbrook 2003).  Although Hurricane Katrina has no 
direct connection to economic integration, the operations of the global marketplace have 
routinely created ‘perfect storms’ at the national or sub-national level that have revealed and 
deepened socioeconomic divisions in much the same way as Katrina.   In the next section of the 
article I outline the processes that have led to that deepening, identify the underlying set of 
values,  and indicate the connection with influences on population health.  In the section that 
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follows, I compare and contrast a policy perspective that takes seriously economic and social 
rights related to health with the values of the global marketplace, in a way that is intended in 
particular to interest ‘rights sceptics’.  In the concluding section, I argue that recent trends in 
globalization underscore the urgency of the human rights challenge to the global marketplace 
while at the same time offering some rather pessimistic observations about the prospects for 
policy change, which may indeed be read as reinforcing the scepticism I have tried to address in 
the preceding section.  The tentative nature of the arguments in this section will be dissatisfying 
to some readers, but I am far less confident in arguing the  feasibility of peaceful solutions to the 
inequities magnified by the global marketplace than I am in describing the channels of influence 
linking the global marketplace with routine violations of economic and social rights or in arguing 
the merits of a human rights perspective as against the “savage sorting of winners and losers” 
(Sassen 2010) that is now under way.  Hence, the epigraph for this article.  
 
Globalization and the neoliberal transformation 
Eduardo Galeano (2000:166) has described globalization as “a magic galleon that spirits 
factories away to poor countries;” this effect and its consequences for employment and 
livelihood are perhaps the most familiar dimensions of globalization.   A shift in labor-intensive 
manufacturing out of high-income countries and into low-wage Export Processing Zones was 
clearly in evidence by the late 1970s (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980).  Since then, the 
organization of production across multiple national borders has become much more sophisticated 
and fine-grained  (Dicken 2007), leading to the emergence of a global labor market (Schrecker 
2009a) that has increased economic inequality as divisions have deepened among integrated, 
precarious and excluded forms of employment (Cox 1999).  The nature of the incentive for firms 
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to roam the world in search of the lowest wages and most ‘flexible’ employment relations was 
captured in a 2007 article by journalist James Fallows on the phenomenal growth of Chinese 
manufacturing for export markets: “A factory work shift is typically 12 hours, usually with two 
breaks for meals (subsidized or free), six or seven days per week.”  The manager of a US-owned 
plant Fallows interviewed elaborated: “The people here work hard.  They’re young. They’re 
quick. There’s none of this ‘I have to go pick up the kids’ nonsense you get in the States’” 
(Fallows 2007:58).  By the early years of the new century, employment in Mexico’s maquiladora 
manufacturing plants, infamous for low wages and miserable working conditions, had declined 
as production for the US market shifted to China (Anon. 2003; United States General 
Accounting Office 2003); Vietnam was poised to become “the next China” because of its even 
lower labour costs (York 2005); and an editorial in The Africa Report noted that: “Across Africa, 
governments claim a new enthusiasm for the Beijing model: tough political controls combined 
with a determination to accelerate economic growth” (Smith 2010).     
Finance as well as production has been reorganized on a global scale (Schrecker 2009b), 
with the value of predominantly speculative transactions on the world’s foreign exchange 
markets amounting to more than 500 times the value of foreign direct investment in plant and 
equipment.  Even before the dangers of global interconnectedness were demonstated by the 
economic crisis that spread across the world in 2008, rapid disinvestment or ‘capital flight’ had 
reduced the value of national currencies by 50 percent or more and plunged millions of people 
into poverty and economic insecurity in Mexico in 1994-95, several south Asian countries in 
1997-98, and Argentina in 2001. In the aftermath of the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-95, the 
then-managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted the importance of 
“market perceptions: whether the country's policies are deemed basically sound and its economic 
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future, promising,” and warned (threatened?) that “shifts in the market's perception of these 
underlying fundamentals can be quite swift, brutal, and destabilizing” (Camdessus 1995).    
Capital flight, by definition available only to the owners of liquid assets, exacerbates 
economic inequalities by enabling them to avoid (and sometimes even to profit from
1
) economic 
consequences that the working class must live with, while economies are starved of resources 
that could be invested in their own development and external debt burdens become heavier.
2
  
Even the anticipation of capital flight can enable the owners of hypermobile financial assets to 
control the terrain of national social and economic policy; this happened before and after the 
Brazilian elections of 2002, about which financier George Soros famously noted that: "In the 
Roman empire, only the Romans voted. In modern global capitalism, only the Americans vote. 
Not the Brazilians" (Hilton 2002).  One author refers to this dynamic as “a return to property-
based voting rights, but on an international scale” (Harris 1999:32).   
These developments must be understood as the outcome of government policies at the 
national level, and in particular with reference to the influence of the most powerful actors in the 
world system (Bond 2009; Marchak 1991).  Domestic political repression, targeting workers in 
particular, has historically been essential to state strategies of attracting export-oriented foreign 
direct investment and contract production by using low wages and labour market flexibility as a 
source of comparative advantage (Amsden 1990; Deyo 1989).  In the international frame of 
reference, by the end of the 1970s, ‘debt crises’ in many developing economies threatened the 
viability of overexposed private sector lenders in the United States, in particular.  The effect was 
to create an opportunity for the World Bank and and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
were and are dominated by the G7 governments (Buira 2004; Faini and Grilli 2004), to use the 
conditions attached to structural adjustment lending and the threat of being cut off altogether 
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from international borrowing to promote multiple, more or less coordinated domestic policies of 
integrating national economies into the global marketplace.  Reflecting the influence of the 
United States (albeit with crucial support from right-wing governments in Germany and Britain) 
in redesigning the global order, in 1990 economist John Williamson identified what he called the 
Washington Consensus in development policy (Williamson 1990).  He memorably observed a 
few years later that in the process of codification he “deliberately excluded from the list anything 
which was primarily redistributive, as opposed to having equitable consequences as a by-product 
of seeking efficiency objectives, because [he] felt the Washington of the 1980s to be a city that 
was essentially contemptuous of equity concerns” (Williamson 1993:1329). 
 Unfolding in parallel, with an important push from World Bank and IMF promotion of 
trade liberalization, were the multilateral trade negotiations that led to the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the regime of trade policy agreements that it administers, and 
a proliferation of bilateral and regional treaties that further reduce barriers to the cross-border 
flow of goods, services and investment.  These agreements routinely reflect the vastly unequal 
bargaining power of the parties, arising in the first instance from differences in market size:  
access to the US market (for example) is more significant for a small economy like Ecuador or 
Guatemala than its domestic markets will ever be to the US or European Union.  These 
disparities affect not only the negotiation of trade agreements but the conditions under which 
parties make use of dispute resolution procedures (Stiglitz and Charlton 2004).  Livelihoods were 
destroyed as domestic producers were unable to compete with a flood of low-cost, often 
subsidized imports (Carmody 1998; de Ita 2008; Paasch 2009).  Compounding the damage, at 
least over the short run many governments, especially in low-income countries, were unable to 
make up from other sources the substantial losses in tariff revenue associated with trade 
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liberalization (Aizenman and Jinjarak 2009; Baunsgaard and Keen 2010), adding to pressures for 
domestic austerity.  
The social and economic policies in question are usually described as neoliberal, 
although as Jaggar (2002:425) points out, little is “neo” about neoliberalism.  Rather, it 
represents a return to “the non-redistributive laissez faire liberalism of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, which held that the main function of government was to make the world 
safe and predictable for the participants in a market economy,” sometimes using highly coercive 
policies.  Neoliberalism is best understood as comprising simultaneously a policy or program, a 
pattern of reorganizing state institutions, and an ideology (Ward and England 2007).  Raw power 
and ideology frequently operate in a symbiotic way, for example when the transformations in the 
international order described in the preceding paragraphs provide the context in which domestic 
political actors are able to promote radical reorganization of economic life and social institutions 
along market lines using the rationale of necessity (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).   
Especially in the context of human rights, it is useful to understand the internal structure 
of neoliberalism as a system of thought that views the market as the normal and natural basis for 
organizing almost all areas of human activity; generally avoids ethical analysis of distributional 
consequences even when they are fatal; and assigns a heavy burden of proof to those who would 
organize human interactions on any other basis (Harvey 2005a; Somers 2008:38-41)  Two 
examples drawn from World Bank documents, although the Bank is not always as hard-edged in 
its promotion of neoliberalism, suffice to illustrate this point. 
In 1991, a widely published excerpt from a memorandum by World Bank economist 
Lawrence Summers defended on cost-benefit grounds the logic of dumping toxic waste in 
countries where wages (and therefore the cost of illness) are lowest, and people are most likely to 
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die of something else first: “the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone 
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given amount of 
health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the 
country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste 
in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.”  Although a 
subordinate later claimed that he had written the memo and Summers merely signed it, whoever 
wrote the text is correct about the economic logic, and any idea that it represents a pathological 
extreme should be dispelled by an observation in the seldom-quoted last paragraph: “[T]he 
arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in LDCs … could be turned around 
and used more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for liberalization” (Summers 
1991).
3
 
Similar initial presumptions were evident in the Bank’s Social Protection Sector Strategy, 
which invoked the need for “[a] new conceptualization of social protection that is better aligned 
with current worldwide realities” (Holzmann and Jörgensen 2001:1) – realities that Bank policies 
had done a great deal to create.  It redefined the primary objective of social policy as “social risk 
management” (the adaptation of a term from the financial services industry is itself revealing) 
and argued that: “In an ideal world with perfectly symmetrical information and complete, well-
functioning markets, all risk management arrangements can and should be market-based (except 
for the incapacitated)” (Holzmann and Jörgensen 2001:9, 16).  Governmental intervention to 
help the non-incapacitated poor was seen as justified only when market failures result from the 
fact that the poor “are more vulnerable than other population groups because they are typically 
more exposed to risk and have little access to appropriate risk management instruments”  such as 
privately purchased insurance (Holzmann and Jörgensen 2001:10).  To understand the 
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breathtaking sweep of this prescription, recall that market failure as defined in microeconomics 
has nothing to do with the ethics of how markets allocate resources, but simply describes a 
situation in which resources are allocated differently from the way they would be if markets 
worked as economics textbooks suppose they do.  The most frequently cited reasons for market 
failure include incomplete information on the part of buyers and sellers (usually with buyers 
lacking information that is routinely available to sellers at low or zero cost); the existence of 
monopsony or monopoly power, enabling dominant buyers or sellers to restrict prices or 
supplies, and therefore competition, in a particular market; and the existence of negative or 
positive externalities: spillover effects affecting third parties that are unpriced or uncompensated.  
The fact that some people’s basic needs are not met, or that a growing proportion of the 
population is sinking into penury, does not constitute evidence of market failure.     
 What connects globalization, neoliberalism and health?  The report of the Commission on 
Social Determinants of Health (2008) drew attention to the importance of the conditions of life 
and work that make it easy for some people to lead long and healthy lives, and all but impossible 
for others.  More than a billion people in the world suffer from chronically insufficient caloric 
intake, the most extreme form of undernutrition (United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2009).  Economic deprivation creates situations in which the daily routines of 
living are themselves hazardous: for example, charcoal or dung smoke from cooking fires is a 
major contributor to respiratory disease among the world’s poor (Bruce, Perez-Padilla, and 
Albalak 2000; Ezzati and Kammen 2002).  Approximately one billion people now live in slums, 
and rapid urbanization will increase the number to 1.4 billion in 2020 in the absence of effective 
policy interventions (Garau, Sclar, and Carolini 2005).  An estimated 1.1 billion people lack 
access to clean water and 2.6 billion have no access to basic sanitation (United Nations 
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Development Programme 2006).  The health consequences of poverty and economic marginality 
have been too widely described, by clinicians and researchers alike (see e.g. Bates, Fenton, 
Gruber et al. 2004; Farmer 2003; Farmer, Nizeye, Stulac et al. 2006; Prüss-Üstun, Bos, Gore et 
al. 2008), to require further elaboration here. Although the figures cited here pertain primarily to 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), deprivations that are destructive of health persist in 
the richest countries of the world; indeed, they are likely to become more frequent and severe in 
those contexts, for reasons explained later in the article.  These deprivations may or may not 
involve extreme poverty, in either the absolute (as measured by the World Bank) or relative 
sense.  One of the most striking findings in the population health literature is the near-ubiquity of 
socioeconomic gradients in health in countries rich and poor alike (Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health 2008).  Poverty is, however, one of the social determinants of health 
(gender discrimination is another) with respect to which both the evidence base for effects on 
health and the connection to human rights are clearest.  
 It is often claimed that the poverty-reducing effects of global economic growth will, over 
the long term, lead to widely shared improvements in population health (Feachem 2001).  The 
claim is superficially plausible, but between 1981 and 2005, a period during which the value of 
the world’s economic product quadrupled, progress in reducing poverty was modest at best.  
World Bank researchers estimate that 1.4 billion people were living in extreme poverty (defined 
as an income of $1.25/day or less, in 2005 dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity) in 2005.  
This represented a decline of 500 million since 1981, but on a worldwide basis the decline was 
accounted for entirely by fast-growing China.  In other words, wherever in the developing world 
outside China someone escaped extreme poverty – and substantial reductions did occur in some 
countries – someone else fell into it.  Based on a higher poverty line of $2.50/day, the number of 
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people living in poverty worldwide actually increased from 2.7 billion to 3.1 billion, with 
reductions in China offset by substantial increases in India (288 million) and sub-Saharan Africa 
(294 million) (Chen and Ravallion 2008).  When the benefits of growth ‘trickle down’ at all, they 
do so with excruciating slowness (Woodward and Simms 2006).  Further, in some countries, 
potential health benefits of rapid growth and poverty reduction have almost certainly been 
undermined by marketization of health care systems, reducing the affordability of care for much 
of the population and rendering large numbers of people vulnerable to the effects of catastrophic 
health care expenditures (Akin, Dow, Lance et al. 2005; Dummer and Cook 2008; Sepehri, 
Chernomas, and Akram-Lodhi 2003; Tang, Meng, Chen et al. 2008; van Doorslaer, O'Donnell, 
Rannan-Eliya et al. 2006) and by work-related injuries, illnesses and deaths.    
 Although full exploration of the relevant philosophical terrain is outside the scope of this 
article, it is important to note the power of an argument presented by Thomas Pogge (2002; 
2004; 2005; 2007) that this state of affairs is fundamentally unjust.  Pogge begins from the 
proposition that severe poverty in itself represents a violation of human rights, for reasons many 
of which involve its unavoidably destructive effects on health, and argues that moral 
responsibility for poverty (and for poverty reduction) follows causal responsibility across 
national borders by way of the operation of social and economic institutions the actions of which 
have transnational, if not global consequences.  For Pogge, the obligation for which the strongest 
intellectual case can be made is not the ‘positive’ duty to reduce deprivation, even when this 
could be done (as it could be) at minimal cost to the global affluent, but rather the ‘negative’ 
duty to avoid doing harm (specifically, to avoid the human rights violations that are unavoidably 
associated with severe poverty) by way of the design and maintenance of national and 
international social institutions.  Stated another way, if it can be demonstrated that current levels 
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of severe poverty are higher than they would be under a plausible alternative set of social 
institutions, then a duty exists on the part of those with primary responsibility for the design and 
maintenance of those institutions to avoid doing the harm associated with the institutional 
designs in question, instead replacing them with other institutions that would be effective in 
reducing poverty.   Abundant historical evidence links current patterns of deprivation to the 
policies of G7 governments and the financial institutions whose decisions they control, such as 
the World Bank and the IMF.  One must assume that these policies could have reflected different 
priorities such as “adjustment with a human face,” the title of a landmark early UNICEF study 
on the destructive consequences of structural adjustment mandates (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 
eds. 1987).  At least, this presumption must be entertained unless one adopts a purely 
mechanistic conception of the relation between policy positions and the relative strength of 
domestic constituencies that denies the agency of political leaders and in effect absolves them a 
priori of all moral responsibility, on the basis that they were just doing what they had to do.   
 
Economic and social rights against the global marketplace  
Smaller and Murphy (2009) argue that:  “Human rights are not associated with one type of 
economic system.  Human rights provide a framework for policymaking, law and action. But 
they do not dictate any one way of organizing markets or stimulating economic growth.”  
Nevertheless recognition of economic and social rights, in particular, implies certain limits on 
the ways in which markets operate and the extent to which they penetrate social relations; in fact, 
Smaller and Murphy make this point with respect to trade policy and the global market in food.  
The position is supported in general terms by an extensive body of human rights scholarship 
(Berthelot 2007; Eide 2005; Gómez Isa 2005; Oloka-Onyango and Udagama 2003), and with 
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more specific reference to health and globalization by an additional body of analysis (Chapman 
2009; Chapman in press; Schrecker, Chapman, Labonté et al. in press).  In this section of the 
article I outline the value of economic and social rights as a challenge to the global marketplace, 
drawing on some of the relevant human rights instruments, UN system interpretations and 
international law scholarship but not constructing a legal argument.  My aim is rather to illustrate 
the radical contrast between contemporary neoliberalism and a human rights perspective, in a 
way that avoids the self-referential character of much legal scholarship.  In particular, I hope to 
suggest the power of the human rights critique of neoliberalism to colleagues who are sceptical 
of ‘rights-talk’ but whose presence in the relevant intellectual enterprises and political coalitions 
is essential if that power is to be realized. 
Because human rights “are predicated on the intrinsic value and worth of all human 
beings” independent of their situation (Chapman 1993:21), the idea of a human right loses much 
of its meaning if its realization is contingent on an external criterion such as the income of an 
individual, a household, or (on a per capita basis) a country.  The concept of intrinsic value and 
worth assumes special importance because market allocations of resources unavoidably favour 
the well endowed – a point that is clear from Summers’ memo - whereas from a human rights 
perspective “[t]he litmus test … is the extent to which the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged individuals within the community are assured” by any set of policies or 
institutional arrangements” (Chapman 1993:23).  Thus, from a human rights perspective the 
improved health status of the expanding middle class in a fast-growing economy does not offset 
or excuse the persistence of violations of human rights associated with  poverty, economic 
insecurity or lack of access to health care among their less favored compatriots.  
15 
 
Recognition of the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, in the widely 
cited formulation adopted by the Maastricht Conference (1998:¶6), logically requires the 
acknowledgement that rights-holders have a valid claim on resources necessary to the fulfilment 
of those rights, including access to a remedy when that claim is denied (see e.g. Rolnik 
2008:¶49), even though others may assert competing claims based on property or other rights.  
Human rights claims may or may not involve direct provision of resources; they may, instead, 
relate to the priorities that a society adopts as it allocates resources among competing uses and 
users.  Regardless of the specific nature of the claims in question they are matters not of charity 
but of justice - a point made with particular force in the Human Development Report for  2000 
(United Nations Development Programme 2000; see also Yamin 2008) – and claims based on 
human rights may take precedence over claims of other sorts.  Although he was not writing in a 
human rights frame of reference, philosopher Henry Shue (1996) invoked a distinction that is 
relevant in this context between one person’s need for another bowl of black beans and another’s 
desire for another jar of caviar.  The market is incapable of making this distinction, and if the 
black beans are essential for realizing the right to an adequate standard of living or the right to 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health specified in Articles 
11 and 12, respectively, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),  then taking human rights seriously implies a state obligation that must be fulfilled 
even at the cost of reducing the caviar-eater’s opportunities for discretionary consumption.  Here, 
again, think of the far from hypothetical tension in many LMICs between the consumer 
preferences of an emergent middle class or the priorities of real estate investors, able 
successfully to impose their definitions of the public good or the public interest on government 
policy (Ocheje 2007), and the survival needs of a larger segment of the population that remain 
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unmet.  In a different vein, it has frequently been argued that in cases of conflict, human rights 
obligations must take precedence over obligations that arise from the provisions of trade 
agreements (Hunt 2004:¶11, 23; Smaller and Murphy 2009).     
The contrast between the human rights perspective and the values of the global 
marketplace  - decommodification vs. commodification (Bond and Dugard 2008) - is dramatic.  
According to the latter, no one has a claim on (for example) the resources necessary to provide 
“adequate food, clothing and housing,” in the words of Article 11 of ICESCR, unless the 
contents of his or her wallet – in the case of children, the contents of their parents’ wallets – are 
also adequate.  According to the human rights perspective, everyone has such a claim subject 
only to the availability of resources, with availability defined in a frame of reference within 
which human rights are assigned priority.  To provide an illustration of the relevance of this 
distinction to national policy, post-apartheid governments in South Africa  have partially 
privatized water utilities, and have adopted pricing regimes organized around full cost recovery 
and the elimination of cross-subsidies from rich to poor consumers in the pricing structures of 
utilities that remain under public ownership (Loftus 2005; McInnes 2005; Ruiters 2005; Ruiters 
2006).  They have grudgingly provided an inadequate free basic minimum water supply, beyond 
which commercial pricing applies and prepaid meters have allowed the large-scale 
disconnections that inevitably follow, given the unaffordability of water tariffs for the poor, to be 
“socially privatized” and rendered relatively invisible (Harvey 2005b).  A similar critique based 
on the distinction between formal access and real-world affordability has been advanced 
concerning South African housing policy (Miraftab and Wills 2005).  
 Contrast this approach with the interpretation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) that “[t]he direct and indirect costs and charges associated  with 
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securing water must be affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other 
Covenant rights” (Committee on Economic 2003:¶12(c)(ii)) and that:  “Any payment for water 
services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately 
or publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity 
demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with water expenses 
as compared to richer households” (¶ 27).  South African governments’ performance with respect 
to water provision clearly fails to satisfy these requirements.  It could be objected that South 
Africa has not ratified ICESCR.  However, the argument here in the first instance concerns not 
governments’ legal obligations – and a strong case can be made that South Africa’s water 
policies contravene the economic and social rights provisions of its own constitution (Bond and 
Dugard 2008; Flynn and Chirwa 2005) - but rather the normative challenge that economic and 
social rights present to the values of the marketplace and the consequences of commercialization.   
From this analysis it follows that to respect, protect and fulfil economic and social rights 
obligations will often require substantial redistribution of resources.   The necessary resources 
must first be available to the state in question  – a point recognized in Article 2(1) of ICESCR, 
which requires each state party “to take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.”  This is often referred to as the progressive realization principle.  However, resource 
availability cannot be defined only by the preferences of the powerful.  Johannesburg’s rich 
suburbanites would no doubt prefer today’s water tariff structure which does little to discourage 
them from filling their swimming pools, and a national income distribution – among the world’s 
most unequal – that permits them to do so while the poor remain subject to disconnection and the 
social control mechanisms of prepaid metering. Thus, human rights claims must confront what 
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one scholar has referred to “failures of political will that are cloaked in claims of resource 
scarcity” (Yamin 2009:13). CESCR has also held that “even in times of severe resources 
constraints … the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected by the 
adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes” (Committee on Economic 1990:¶12).   It 
further held that states that have ratified the relevant instruments are obligated immediately to 
fulfill a “minimum core content” with regard to each economic, social, and cultural right 
(Committee on Economic 1990:¶10).  General Comment 14, the Committee’s explication of the 
right to health under ICESCR, enumerates an extensive list of core obligations related to the right 
to health, insisting that that “a state party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its 
non-compliance with the core obligations  … which are non-derogable” (Committee on 
Economic 2000:¶47; for further explication, see Chapman 2002).  Above and beyond  core 
obligations, “there is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the 
right to health are not permissible.  If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State 
party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful 
consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the State party's maximum 
available resources” (¶ 32). The General Comment on the right to water (Committee on 
Economic 2003:¶19) contains essentially identical language.   
 Taken together, the non-derogability of core obligations and the presumption against 
retrogression clearly render impermissible an entire range of policies that invoke anticipated 
long-term gain as a justification for short-term pain.  This is not just an academic point.  
Consider the approach taken by a team of World Bank economists to health and development in 
the former Soviet bloc following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  They acknowledged that 
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neoliberal policies had led to deterioration in the health status of much of the population, but 
justifed that effect with reference to anticipated “improvements in health status, through long-run 
increases in real income, more effective approaches to disease prevention, healthier lifestyles, 
improved regulation of environmental and occupational risks and incentives for higher-quality 
health care” (Adeyi, Chellaraj, Goldstein et al. 1997:133).  In this vein Narula (2006:703) notes 
that a rights-based, as distinct from an “economic,” approach to hunger and food security will 
not tolerate policies that rely on market forces to boost agricultural production if they reduce the 
ability of people to feed themselves over the short-term, for example by eliminating subsidies for 
agricultural inputs or food purchases.    
The link with explicitly redistributive policies underscores the incompatibility of the 
human rights perspective with today’s drift toward what international relations scholar Richard 
Falk has called “the social disempowerment of the state” that “follows from the impact of 
neoliberal ideas, reinforced by arguments about competitiveness in more closely linked regional 
and world markets” (Falk 2000:23).  In fact, Falk’s description of how neoliberalism has 
transformed the role of the state is incomplete:  in some respects, neoliberal globalization has 
required expansion of state powers, for example to relocate populations in order to facilitate 
conversion of the land they occupy to higher-value uses or monitor compliance with ‘workfare’ 
requirements attached to income support (Peck and Tickell 2002).  At issue rather are state 
willingness and capacity to redistribute resources in an egalitarian way that is consistent with 
human rights commitments (redistribution upward being all too frequent), including regulating 
the activities of large and powerful private actors like transnational corporations.   The point 
remains that living up to core human rights obligations even – perhaps especially -- in a low-
income country would “require an activist, committed state party, with a carefully honed set of 
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public policies related to the right to health” (Chapman 2002:205) – this in a context where, in 
the words of a former UN special rapporteur on housing rights, “globalization and the process of 
increasing economic integration have limited the role and capacity of States to provide adequate 
resources and other provisions which are often necessary in fulfilling economic, social and 
cultural rights” (Kothari 2002:¶51).  The contrast between what neoliberalism demands and 
accepts from state institutions and what a human rights perspective requires cannot be clearer.    
Human rights offer citizens an opportunity to hold their  governments accountable  for 
performance with respect to a range of social determinants of health  (Potts 2008; Riedel 2009; 
Yamin 2009).  Despite much talk about a post-Westphalian order, implementation of economic 
and social rights specified in international law usually depends on entrenchment in national 
legislation or constitutions, in a form that rights-holders can seek to enforce through the courts 
(Eide 2007; Gloppen 2008; Schrecker et al in press).  The effectiveness of such provisions has 
been most clearly demonstrated with respect to human rights claims involving access to essential 
medicines (Hogerzeil 2006; Hogerzeil, Samson, Casanovas et al. 2006), but the available 
research also describes effective economic social and economic rights litigation of other kinds.  
Notably, an investigation (Gauri and Brinks, eds., 2008) of litigation related to the right to health 
and education in five countries (South Africa, Brazil, India, Nigeria and Indonesia, with cases 
involving the right to health by far the more numerous) concluded that “legalizing demand for 
[social and economic] rights might [sic] well have averted tens of thousands of deaths in the 
countries studied in this volume and has likely enriched the lives of millions of others” (Brinks 
and Gauri 2008:303; for a more eclectic and less conclusive range of studies involving both 
high- and low-income countries see Langford, ed., 2008).  
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However, support for the position of rights sceptics comes from at least one country that 
has entrenched a right to health in its constitution – Brazil – where some researchers find that 
improvements in access to medicines resulting from litigation have not only failed to reduce 
health inequalities, as access to the courts is more readily available to the better off (da Silva and 
Terrazas 2008; Ferraz 2009), but also magnified health policy’s inherent tendency to focus on 
pharmaceutical cures for particular diseases rather than on health system strengthening or social 
determinants of health (Petryna 2009:chapter 4).  The pharmaceutical industry, an important 
domestic political constituency in Brazil, stands to benefit from the success of such litigation, 
and indeed it has been claimed that pharmaceutical companies have paid lawyers to assist with it 
and have supported patient organizations (Jurberg 2009).   
Perhaps for this reason, the Brazilian case is an exception to the general rule that courts 
hesitate to issue rulings with major policy and budgetary implications for government (see e.g. 
Liebenberg 2008 on South Africa), despite the clearly identified need to analyze budgetary 
processes and priorities in order to assess the priority that governments attach to human rights 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007).  Evidence of this selective 
reticence does not justify rejecting a strategy of entrenching social and economic rights in law.  It 
does suggest limits to the strategy, having to do in the first instance with organizational and 
administrative problems such as the individualistic bias of litigation in many legal systems, the 
reticence of courts to trespass on the terrain of government budgetary decisions, and the 
possibility of corporate capture of human rights litigation (analogous to regulatory capture).  A 
further set of limitations, having to do with the nature of the political process, is addressed in the 
next section of the article.        
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The tendency of globalization to magnify inequalities creates a need to redistribute 
resources and opportunities among nations, as well as within them, if commitments to economic 
and social rights are to be meaningful.  This will require not only a renewed commitment to the 
value of state action at a national level, but also a reinvigorated and explicitly value-driven 
multilateral commitment to global justice, as improbable as that may seem.  More specifically, 
the need is for ways of holding to account governments of countries that occupy the 
commanding heights of the world economic and geopolitical order whenever their policy choices 
compromise economic and social rights outside their borders.  Human rights law at first seems ill 
suited to the task, both because of its primary application to nation-states (rather than, for 
example, international organizations) and its historical focus on how those nation-states act 
toward those within their borders.  However, the existing body of international  human rights law 
provides at least two promising entry points.   
The first of these is the obligation of a state party under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR to 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant” -  an 
obligation the Maastricht Guidelines (Maastricht Conference 1998:¶19) extend to participation in 
international organizations and their governing bodies.  This obligation is of special relevance to 
the operations of the World Bank and IMF, which as noted are dominated by a handful of G7 
governments.  (Hammonds and Ooms 2004) thus argue that World Bank  and IMF policies P 
must at the very least meet the test of non-interference with a borrower country’s ability to 
satisfy core obligations and pursue progressive realization of economic and social rights, and that 
Bank member states are in breach of their obligations under ICESCR when they support policies 
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that do not meet this test.  The argument is of special importance because the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, a prerequisite for obtaining debt relief under a series of 
multilateral arrangements that began in the mid-1990s, in many respects replicates the 
destructive features of earlier structural adjustment conditionalities (Gore 2004; Sheppard and 
Leitner 2010).  Ceilings for increased public expenditure on health care and education, which 
have prevented the expansion of health systems in sub-Saharan Africa even when donor funds 
had been committed, and conditionalities that have interfered with famine relief are cases in 
point (Centre for Economic Governance and AIDS in Africa and RESULTS Educational Fund 
2009; Narula 2006:715-718; Ziegler 2009:¶54). 
A second entry point arises from an expanding body of analysis and jurisprudence, 
notably from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights, regarding the extraterritorial obligations of states and actors such as transnational 
corporations that are in at least some respects under the control of states (McCorquodale and 
Simons 2007; Narula 2006).  A relatively straightforward example involves export credit 
agencies (ECAs) which, along with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the commercial 
lending unit of the World Bank, play an essential role in financing the activities of transnational 
corporations in LMICs, notably in natural resource extraction and processing. ECAs are clearly 
under the control of their national governments, and therefore should be held to account when 
the corporate investments they support interfere with the host country’s human rights obligations 
(McCorquodale and Simons 2007:607-8, 611-3).  A further application of human rights law is 
suggested by the argument that states can be “seen to be facilitating extraterritorial harm 
perpetrated by a corporate national” when they negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 
LMICs that contain investor protection provisions that restrict the host state’s ability to regulate 
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the performance of foreign investors (McCorquodale and Simons 2007:621-623).  Since most 
contemporary bilateral and regional trade agreements contain such provisions, which are among 
the reasons for describing trade agreements as comprising the constitution of a new global 
economic order (Grinspun and Kreklewich 1994; Schneiderman 2000), the possibilities are 
intriguing.   
Even more than within national borders, the problem here is one of moving from treaty 
language to implementation. It has been written that: “The right to food [for example] is hard 
law; it is binding on states upon ratification of the ICESCR.  To characterize the right to food as 
soft law misrepresents and undermines the legal obligations of states to respect fundamental 
human rights norms.  The problem lies not with the binding nature of the norm, but with 
weaknesses in implementation, enforcement, and a lack of universal ratification” (Narula 
2006:775).  I would argue that universal ratification is less important that the operationally 
equivocal nature of bindingness in international human rights law – or, stated another way, the 
problematic hardness of “hard law” in that frame of reference.  Although it is potentially 
significant that (for example) the United States has ratified neither ICESCR nor comparably 
important instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “potentially” 
is the operative word.  Universal ratification would not necessarily or automatically improve 
compliance, domestically or internationally. The key issue is rather the absence of mechanisms 
for sanctioning non-compliant states parties to the relevant human rights instruments, whether in 
the form of a supranational institution (improbable) or in the form of an agreed-upon regime of 
sanctions for non-compliance analogous to, perhaps even combined with, the regime of sanctions 
established under trade agreements (superficially, somewhat less improbable).   
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Too much can be made of the comparison between trade agreements and human rights 
instruments, but it does have value, since under international law each category of agreement 
applies only to those countries whose governments have agreed to be bound by its provisions. 
Trade agreements incorporate mechanisms for dispute resolution, but there are no ‘trade police’ 
to enforce their findings.  Complaints are initiated, in the first instance, from motives of 
commercial self-interest and compliance is secured, or not, by way of financial penalties 
imposed by national governments on imports from the non-compliant state.  Alternatively, in the 
case of investor-state provisions in many bilateral and regional trade agreements, foreign 
investors may be able to advance claims for compensation for financial losses in host-country 
courts on terms more favorable than those available to firms within the host country’s borders.  
Giving substance to the concept of bindingness in human rights law, at least as it applies to 
international agreements, will require analogous mechanisms – including a way either of 
harnessing commercial self-interest in the service of human rights obligations or providing for 
complaint initiation, dispute resolution and compliance procedures driven at least in part by other 
motivations.  The political difficulties are briefly discussed in the next section of the article, in 
terms of a future research agenda with a particular focus on the domestic political conditions 
under which national governments might agree to such a set of procedures.   
“Now, more than ever”:  Globalization and human rights politics   
“Now, more than ever, the obligation to eradicate poverty must not be forgotten” is how the UN 
independent expert on human rights and extreme poverty initially responded to the global 
economic crisis (Sepúlveda Carmona 2008).  It is far from clear that her observation was heeded.  
By mid-2009, in the United States (the epicentre of the crisis, and one of the world’s richest 
countries), more than a million schoolchildren were homeless or at imminent risk of 
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homelessness, and one in four children lived in a household that was receiving federally funded 
food vouchers, or “food stamps” (DeParle and Gebeloff 2009; Eckholm 2009).  Although major 
increases in poverty were anticipated in LMICs, responses in terms of expanded social protection 
have been described as “minimal” (McCord 2010).   At the international level, a critique of 
initial responses to the crisis on the part of high-income countries and multilateral institutions 
noted that the responses were not rights-based and focused on restoring economic growth rather 
than benefiting the poor and otherwise vulnerable, remarking that the economic impacts of the 
crisis “are not merely unfortunate; they signify prima facie massive and systemic breaches of 
international human rights law, such as the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
and to continuous improvement of living conditions and the right to work” (Fukuda-Parr and 
Salomon 2009).  It is worth reiterating that such breaches will continue as routine and 
unremarkable in the absence of more effective compliance mechanisms. 
  Despite this rather bleak initial prognosis, “now, more than ever” sums up the relevance 
of the human rights challenge to the global marketplace in view of three sets of changes in the 
nature of that marketplace.   
  In a development that initially appears paradoxical, the reorganization of production and 
finance on a global scale has intensified local conflicts over the uses of space.  A 2003 UN 
Habitat report on The Challenge of Slums drew on 29 city case studies to conclude that: “[T]he 
prime resources of the city are increasingly appropriated by the affluent.  And globalization is 
inflationary as the new rich are able to pay more for a range of key goods, especially land” 
(United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2003:43).  Real estate is of growing importance 
as a means of capital accumulation, even in some of the world’s poorest countries, as 
“developers are lured into the property sector by the profits to be realized from an emerging 
27 
 
consumer class of ‘winners’ in the globalization of these urban economies, and from 
multinational and local corporate investors” (Shatkin 2008:387, writing about metropolitan 
Manila; emphasis in original). Compelling incentives are thereby created for displacing the poor, 
often with active state support, in favor of higher-valued uses and users.  In 2008, eviction of 
more than 200,000 families was anticipated in Manila as a result of planned developments 
(Shatkin 2008:395).  An official of the state in which Mumbai is located justified a program of 
slum demolitions by saying that “we showed political courage for the first time and sent a strong 
signal that you cannot expect free space in this city anymore” (Lakshmi 2005).  Large numbers 
of poor urban residents were displaced by Beijing’s highly profitable hosting of the Olympic 
games and South Africa’s of the FIFA World Cup (Bénit-Gbaffou 2009; Fowler 2008; Newton 
2009); India appears to be following the same path in advance of the Commonwealth Games 
(Burke 2010).  In various ways, the rich are simply outbidding the rest for the resources of the 
city.   
 The financial crisis of 2008 was not an isolated event, but rather one manifestation 
among several of a new and distinctively volatile and predatory form of global capitalism 
(Sassen 2010).  The securitized high-risk mortgages that were among the triggers of the crisis 
themselves suggest the scope of the problem: “[W]ith these instruments, housing becomes an 
efficient mechanism for getting at the savings of households worldwide – a form of primitive 
accumulation that moves faster than extracting profit from lowering wages ” (Sassen 2009:412; 
see also Sassen 2008) – a variation on the theme of real estate as a means of capital 
accumulation.  Escalated bidding wars for metropolitan space are now accompanied by a new 
bidding war outside the cities, with potentially far-reaching consequences for health, that 
involves large-scale leases and acquisitions of agricultural land by state or private investors from 
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high-income countries for food or biofuel production, primarily for home-country consumption 
and motivated both by anticipated profits and concerns about security of supply.  These 
acquisitions may threaten the availability and affordability of food in the countries where they 
occur, and often involve agreements that are not available for public scrutiny (Cotula, 
Vermeulen, Leonard et al. 2009; Smaller and Mann 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  
The implications of this pattern for the right to food and associated health outcomes must be 
considered in conjunction with a  drastically increased flow of investment  into global 
commodity markets for many food products.  Many reseachers argue that speculative activity in 
such markets contributed substantially to the 2008 increase in food prices that proved disastrous 
for the poor in many parts of the world; certainly, the increases cannot be plausibly attributed to 
changes either in supply or in demand on the part of real-world consumers (Ruel, Garrett, 
Hawkes et al. 2010; Wahl 2009).   
  A final set of changes, related to and often driving the intensification of contests over 
urban space, has been described in various ways.  Distinctions between north and south based on 
national boundaries or per capita income statistics lose much of their meaning when (as in 
Mexico City, for example) Roche Bobois and Bang & Olufsen showrooms sit side by side 
overlooking a freeway, behind a high steel fence (author’s personal observation, April 2010), in 
a metropolis where in 2000 three out of every ten households lived on a monthly income of $340 
or less (Connolly 2009).  Sassen refers to “peripheralization at the core” (Sassen 2006; Sassen-
Koob 1982) of cities in high-income countries – a pattern exemplified by recent observations of 
the living conditions of undocumented Mexican workers in New York City: “a basement shared 
by eighteen single men, an unheated garage that is home to two Mexican families, an abandoned 
tractor trailer … and an abandoned tugboat and barge, both vessels half in and half out of the 
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water, and each providing housing to another two or three men” (Hellman 2008:159).  The 
connection with migration is noted by Sassen in terms of global “survival circuits” in which 
predominantly female workers flee desperate conditions in LMICs for uncertain futures as part 
of an expanding pool of low-wage service sector labour in the precarious, largely unregulated 
labor markets of high-income cities (Sassen 2002).   
   As patterns of economic and social inclusion and exclusion within geographical 
boundaries are (re)organized around  the terms of connection to the global economy, it is useful 
to draw on the analogy suggested by Robinson’s argument for “social” rather than “territorial 
cartography” (Robinson 2002).  In cartography, isolines connect points of equal value on a map; 
in the politics of the twenty-first century, they can be understood metaphorically as connecting 
individuals and households based on their roles and opportunities in the global economy, and 
offering a guide to the contours of their political allegiances. Isolines marking distributions of 
resources and opportunity now routinely cross national borders (recall the Mexico City 
example), but the gradients they describe may be as steep within a single neighborhood as on a 
global scale (Perlman 2010:176).  The disposable populations referred to by Somers are to be 
found everywhere, and in many contexts globalization is increasing their numbers and their 
desperation even as it creates unimaginable wealth for a few.    
 Even within the UN system, there is no shortage of human rights analysis that relates 
globalization to social determinants of health – a point that can be illustrated, in addition to 
examples cited earlier, with respect to housing and food.  Housing was long ago identified “as 
the environmental factor most frequently associated with conditions for disease in 
epidemiological analysis” by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights 
(1991:¶8(d)) , and the relation between globalization and violations of the right to adequate 
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housing has been consistently foregrounded by two special rapporteurs on the topic since the 
position was created in 2000 (see e.g. Kothari 2001:¶59; Kothari 2002:¶51 et seq; Kothari 
2004:¶30).  The first rapporteur drafted a set of guidelines for the (very limited) conditions under 
which “forced evictions” are permissible that were quite detailed enough to be incorporated into 
development assistance policy and lending conditions (Kothari 2006: Appendix), but meaningful 
take up has not happened.  The second rapporteur issued an especially far-reaching report that 
drew from historical literature and contemporary research on the worldwide financial crisis that 
began in 2008 to situate contemporary housing and homelessness crises in the context of 
neoliberalism and to recommend a variety of policy measures, including “massive investment in  
housing … States must react as promptly as they did to intervene in the international financial 
system to address the housing crisis worldwide, so as to implement their obligation to protect the 
right to adequate housing for all” (Rolnik 2009:¶91).  Again, evidence of recognition in public 
policy is minimal. 
 Analyses of globalization and the right to food are more recent, but similarly trenchant.  
In 2008 the second special rapporteur on the right to food devoted much of his first annual report 
to the crisis created by rising food prices, arguing for a rights-based response organized around 
avoiding policies with a negative impact on the right to food (including some promotion of 
biofuels), controlling private actors, and international cooperation on several fronts (De Schutter 
2008:¶24).  Subsequently, he proposed a set of guidelines for large-scale land leases and 
acquisitions, emphasizing the human rights obligations both of home states and the World Bank 
(De Schutter 2009b).  In another (non-UN) publication, he has emphasized the need to ensure 
that trade agreements and high-income country trade policies avoid violating the right to food, 
emphasizing the extraterritorial obligations of states and arguing (for example) that “where a 
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state heavily subsidizes agricultural products that are exported by companies under its 
jurisdiction, with the effect of crowding out the local producers in the receiving markets, this 
should be treated as a violation of the right to food by the exporting state, since it constitutes a 
threat to food security in the importing country” (De Schutter 2009a:17).  Housing and food are 
useful case studies because sophisticated human rights analyses are available, as well, from 
international civil society organizations.
4
  The problem, in short, is not the adequacy of analysis 
but the barriers to action, and these must be located with reference to the domestic and 
international political economy of resistance to policies of redistributing resources and regulating 
private accumulation.  
In the national frame of reference former Brazilian finance minister Rubens Ricupero has 
noted that “no serious measures can be taken to put an end to extreme poverty and inequality 
without forcing the richest segments of the population not only to pay taxes, but to pay much 
more than others” (quoted in Beghin 2008:3).  Teichman’s recent analysis of Mexican and 
Chilean social policy (Teichman 2008) illustrates how and why this objective is often frustrated 
in practice.  She refers, for example, not only to labour movements weakened by globalization 
(see also Hershberg 2007) but also to the threat of capital flight and, in the Mexican case, to the 
continuing burden of government debt arising from a public bailout of well connected bankers 
during the 1990s (Cypher 2001).  She concludes that “resisters to a new redistributive settlement 
may include not just the business community, but also upper and middle-income groups … along 
with technocratic allies within the state” (Teichman 2008:447) whose links with the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank were forged during the era of structural adjustment.  
With specific reference to human rights, Teichman – who interviewed numerous high-level 
officials in her study countries – observes that in Mexico: 
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Discussions between the government’s Intersecretarial Commission on Human Rights 
and human rights organizations produced, in early 2004, a consensus on a new human 
rights bill. In the negotiations, civil society groups … pressed for and achieved an 
expanded concept of human rights that included social rights (labor rights and measures 
prohibiting discrimination against women). However, the president’s legal office 
removed the social and labor rights aspects of the bill before sending it on to Congress 
(Teichman 2009:74). 
With variations to reflect particular national contexts, these insights are almost certainly 
transferable to the politics of redistribution and rights in many other settings, as the new social 
cartography of a globalized world changes class structure and political allegiances, minimizing 
the risks to governments from simply ignoring those with little to offer in the global marketplace.   
An illustration of how this dynamic plays out in practice can be found in the United 
Nations Development Programme’s 2005 Human Development Report: “Were India to show the 
same level of dynamism and innovation in tackling basic health inequalities as it has displayed in 
global technology markets, it could rapidly get on track for achieving the MDG [Millennium 
Development Goal] targets” (United Nations Development Programme 2005:30).  The new 
social cartography similarly helps to explain why (for example) some LMIC governments have 
agreed to ‘TRIPs-plus’ provisions in bilateral and regional trade agreements that undermine 
flexibilities in patent protection for essential medicines negotiated under the WTO regime, with 
full knowledge of the health consequences (Roffe, Von Braun, and Vivas-Eugui 2008; Shaffer 
and Brenner 2009), and why South Africa’s government resisted public provision of 
antiretroviral therapy even after repeated court judgements held this to be a human right under 
the provisions of the country’s constitution (Kapczynski and Berger 2009; Nattrass 2006).  
Politics of all kinds involve a series of exchange relations between rulers and ruled and, like the 
dispossessed post-Katrina, people living and working near the bottom of the gradients generated 
by globalization’s new cartography have little to offer their rulers, even under conditions of 
formal democracy.  
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These observations suggest not only the normative urgency of rights-based approaches to 
health and social policy, but also the value of a research agenda that includes careful 
enumeration of domestic constituencies that would gain and lose from a rights-based approach to 
social and economic policy, in much the same way that social scientists have examined 
governmental commitments to trade liberalization.  As an illustration of the value of this 
comparison, although political scientist Michael Lusztig (1996) examines only one case 
(Mexico) to which the international pressures of globalization are relevant, and he pays too little 
attention to political economy (cf. Babb 2002), his historical study of the circumstances under 
which governments pursue trade liberalization is valuable for its emphasis on the importance of  
domestic “facilitating coalitions” which are not, it must be emphasized, the same thing as 
popular majorities.  Under what conditions can we envision national governments committing 
themselves to a meaningful multilateral framework for human rights accountability that would 
constrain their domestic and foreign policy choices to the same degree as contemporary trade 
agreements?  
 Valuable descriptive comparisons of the rationales for stated concern for global health in 
the foreign policy of high-income countries have been provided by Labonté and Gagnon (2010), 
who find that human rights are frequently referenced at the level of rhetoric, but without concrete 
policy commitments, while concerns for security predominate. A more analytical view is 
provided by Ziai (2010), who uses both documentary sources and interviews to examine the 
development policies of the Social Democratic-Green coalition that governed Germany between 
1998 and 2005.  Notwithstanding a manifesto commitment to development policy as structural 
economic change, the coalition failed to challenge the dubious presumption that poverty 
reduction is best achieved through growth-oriented global market integration; it also failed 
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successfully to champion such more specific initiatives as repudiating odious debts or integrating 
development objectives into trade policy.  Ziai explains this with reference to the need for 
multilateral agreement involving governments whose views on  critical aspects of the global 
marketplace had little in common, but also to resistance from the German finance ministry, 
which on some major issues disregarded policy resolutions of the Bundestag.  Our attention is 
thereby directed back to how the new transnational cartographies of wealth and influence 
associated with globalization affect the distribution of political resources and allegiances within 
national borders, and consequently the prospects for advancing economic and social rights 
internationally.   
These are complicated, intractable issues that require further social scientific exploration.  
They present challenges for research and advocacy, but their intractability does not confirm the 
‘realist’ view that economic and social rights as articulated in international law are merely 
aspirational – a view that ultimately represents a generic abandonment of the ideal of a rule-
governed international order.  At the same time, human rights and the policies that give effect to 
them must never be regarded as a deus ex machina; historically, when they have gained meaning 
beyond the level of rhetoric it has always been as a result of political contestation, often long and 
bitter.  A former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has described them as “the closest 
thing we have to a shared values system for the world” (Robinson 2007: 242).  This may be too 
strong, but their legal recognition nevertheless may offer the most plausible route to achieving by 
non-violent means the transformation of national and international institutions and practices that 
deny opportunities for good health and long life to literally billions of people.   
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Notes 
 
1
  As in the case of wealthy Mexicans who shifted their assets into US dollars before the peso 
collapse of 1994, and were then able to purchase Mexican assets at devalued prices with their 
dollar holdings. 
2
  Economic historian Thomas Naylor (1987) observed more than two decades ago that “[t]here 
would be no ‘debt crisis’ without large-scale capital flight” (p. 370).  More recent research on 40 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest region, estimates the value of capital flight 
between 1970 and 2004, plus imputed interest earnings, at $607 billion – a figure that is roughly 
three times the value of those countries’ external debt obligations (Boyce and Ndikumana 2008).    
3
  Summers went on to positions including Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton 
administration, president of Harvard University, and most recently Director of President 
Obama’s National Economic Council.  At least in the United States, public life clearly rewards 
those who do not question the expendability of the poor. 
4
  Notably the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (http://www.cohre.org), the FoodFirst 
Information and Action Network (http://www.fian.org) and the Institute for Food and 
Development Policy (http://www.foodfirst.org).  
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